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FEDERAL TAX SYMPOSIUM
A TAX INCENTIVE APPROACH TO THE
DEPLETION ALLOWANCE DILEMMA
THOMAS E. BULLErr, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTMON
As early as 1913,1 Congress acknowledged that mineral de-
posits, like capital base machinery, are wasting assets which re-
quire preservation through tax benefits. Because the nation's cur-
rent dependence on unstable, foreign sources of oil is universally
viewed as undesirable, and even dangerous, it would now seem
particularly important to maintain an economic attractiveness for
the mining of coal so that energy and economic independence
could be regained. However, the deduction for depletion in one of
the most significant coal production arrangements, contract min-
ing, continues to flounder in a state of turmoil that has endured
for decades. 2 The Internal Revenue Service, by its restrictive reg-
ulations, and the courts in their interpretation of these regula-
tions, are compromising this basic tax incentive in coal produc-
tion. In addition, the inconsistent position of the Service and
* Partner, Arnold, Bulleit & Kinkead, Lexington, Ky. A.B., University of
Kentucky, 1966; J.D., University of Louisville, 1971; LL.M. (Taxation), Ge-
orgetown University, 1976. The author extends his appreciation to Mr. William
Rigsby, University of Kentucky Law School, Class of 1980, for his help in the
preparation of this article.
1 The Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, 62, para. B, 38 Stat. 166, provided for
deductibility of "a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of prop-
erty arising out of its use or employment in the business," and made specific refer-
ence to deduction for exhaustion of mines. Current federal income tax statutes,
although allowing a deduction for exhaustion of property used in trade or business
or held for the production of income, treat this deduction as distinct from the
deduction for depletion of mineral deposits.
2 See generally Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959); Paragon Jewel Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 380 U.S. 624 (1965); Wiener, "Economic Interest". The Rise
and Fall of a Slogan, 37 TAxEs 777 (1959).
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diverse interpretations of the Treasury regulations3 in the area of
depletion have substantially obfuscated the application and oper-
ation of the tax laws as they affect these contractual
arrangements.
The factual setting in which this confusion arises involves an
owner of coal, whether in fee or as lessor or sublessor, and an
entity authorized by some contractual arrangement to mine the
coal (a "contract miner"). For decades the courts have had diffi-
culty in interpreting the tax law with regard to depletion as be-
tween these parties. Early decisions of the Supreme Court estab-
lished the concept of an "economic interest in the coal in place"
as the primary element upon which a depletable interest should
be based and developed a set of guidelines to supplement a bare
authorizing statute,4 but unfortunately the courts have tended to
emphasize the objective but economically unrealistic criterion of
the terminability of the contract in determining whether an eco-
nomic interest is held. This test has been supplemented and ex-
panded by subsequent guidelines, many of which have been
adopted by the Treasury regulations.3
Thus, as the law now stands, the existence of a depletable
interest in the mineral is determined by the nature of the termi-
nation provision in the contract between the parties. This method
of determining a deduction for depletion ignores the economic re-
alities of the capital intensive surface mining industry by forcing
the parties in a mining development program to select between
tax considerations and economic considerations. If for economic
reasons the owner wishes to retain the depletion allowance, he
must use a license, lease, or contractual arrangement which may
be terminated without cause on short notice. If the miner is to
produce coal under this arrangement, he must make an enormous
investment in equipment, purchase insurance, and build haul
roads, silt dams and ponds in reliance upon a contractual rela-
tionship which may be terminated in this abrupt fashion-an eco-
nomically unrealistic posture. And, unfortunately, if the parties
attempt to find some middle contractual ground, they are faced
3 Rev. Rul. 73-33, 1973-1 C.B. 307; Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301; Rev. Rul.
74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179.
4 See, e.g., Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
5 E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200 & T.D. 7261, 1973-
1 C.B. 309.
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with the almost impossible task of determining the allocation of
the allowance in the current milieu of increasingly diverse appli-
cation of law and regulations.
In matters as significant as domestic energy production,
surely tax considerations and economic requirements should be
consistent. This article offers model drafts of contract clauses
which should assist tax planners in clarifying this relationship
and proposes regulatory modifications which would bring our old-
est mineral development tax benefit into a tax incentive posture."
H. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEPLETION CONCEPT
The "reasonable allowance for depletion," currently author-
ized by section 611 of the Internal Revenue Code, is entirely a
matter of legislative grace7 which was first provided by Congress
in the Revenue Act of 1913 and then adopted in various forms in
all subsequent revenue acts.8 The analysis of the allowance for
depletion as stated in United States v. Ludey9 by Mr. Justice
Brandeis is the accepted interpretation of the legislative intent
and purpose for the deduction:10
6 While the argument is often propounded by advocates attempting to realize
the benefits of the depletion allowance, there is no legislative history indicating
conclusively that the intent of Congress in authorizing the allowance for depletion
was to stimulate the development of natural resources. The primary purpose for
the legislation, as indicated below in the text of this article, seems to have been to
compensate the mineral owner for the wasting of a capital resource. See note 10
infra. However, it would be unfortunate not to utilize the traditional concept of
depletion as a tax incentive for mineral production.
Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215 (1959); Commissioner v. Southwest Explora-
tion Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1955); Commissioner v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362,
369 (1938); Anderson v. Commissioner 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940).
a Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); United
States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 303 (1927).
274 U.S. 295 (1927).
10 There is a little legislative history with regard to the legislative purpose of
the depletion allowance. Committee reports addressed related questions but un-
fortunately did not mention the specific purpose of the depletion allowance. See S.
REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1919); H.R. REP. No. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1925). Subsequent cases followed the Ludey analysis as to the purpose of the
depletion allowance. E.g., Commissioner v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362, 366
(1938); Commissioner v. Eble Oil Land Dev. Co., 303 U.S. 372, 375 (1938); Ander-
son v. Commissioner, 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940); Parsons v. Smith, 359 U.S. 215, 220
(1959).
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The depletion charge permitted as a deduction from gross in-
come in determining the taxable income of mines for any year
represents the reduction in the mineral contents of the
reserves from which the product is taken. The reserves are rec-
ognized as wasting assets. The depletion effected by operation
is likened to the using up of raw material in making the prod-
uct of a manufacturing establishment. As the cost of the raw
material must be deducted from the gross income before the
net income can be determined, so the estimated cost of the
part of the reserve used up is allowed. That fact that the re-
serve is hidden from sight presents difficulties in making an
estimate of the amount of deposits. The actual quantity can
rarely be measured. It must be approximated. And because the
quantity originally in the reserve is not actually known, the
percentage of the whole withdrawn in any year and hence the
appropriate depletion charge, is necessarily a rough estimate.
But Congress concluded, in the light of experience, that it was
better to act upon a rough estimate than to ignore the fact of
depletion . . . .In essence, the deduction for depletion does
not differ from the deduction for depreciation."' 1
Section 611(a) of the Internal Revenue Code in its present
form permits a "reasonable allowance for depletion and for depre-
ciation of improvements" in the case of mines. The Treasury reg-
ulations refer to section 167 and regulations thereunder for the
determination of the allowance for depreciation of improvements
in mines.12 The present juxtaposition of the concepts of depletion
and depreciation in the statutory scheme and the analysis of stat-
utory intent by Mr. Justice Brandeis seem to equate the ideas of
depletion and depreciation as tools to preserve the capital base in
our economic system.2
3
11 274 U.S. at 302-03.
11 Tress. Reg. § 1.611-5(a) (1960).
23 Mr. Justice Clark stated the capital recoupment theory of the depletion
allowance in the following manner.
[The allowance for depletion] is based on the theory that the extraction
of minerals gradually exhausts the capital investment in the mineral de-
posit. Presently, the depletion allowance is a fixed percentage of gross
income which Congress allows to be excluded; this exclusion is designed
to permit a recoupment of the owner's capital investment in the miner-
als so that when the minerals are exhausted, the owner's capital is
unimpaired.
Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 312 (1956). Earlier, the
Court had stated that "[t]he granting of an arbitrary deduction.., of a percent-
1118 [Vol. 82
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With this capital recoupment purpose in mind, the courts
have had to develop their own conceptual guidelines to fill the
void left by the terse authorizing statute and lack of legislative
history. Further complicating any judicial interpretation of the
depletion statutes, section 611 and its predecessors expansively
authorize depletion in a field that includes "mines, oil and gas
wells, other material deposits and timber." The courts have been
required to superimpose a single set of conceptual guidelines (de-
veloped by the following cases and ultimately adopted by Trea-
sury regulation) upon all of these various industries.
The development of judicial guidelines by which the courts
have permitted or denied a deduction for depletion began with
Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co.,1 4 in which a lessee of an iron ore
deposit was deemed to possess a sufficient interest in the deposit
to be permitted to share the depletion allowance with the fee
owner. The 1916 Revenue Act under which the case was litigated
contained no such apportionment rule, but the Court permitted
the deduction to any owner of a "real and substantial interest"15
in the mineral deposit.16 While the lessee did not hold legal title
to the ore deposits, his lease was deemed to have vested the req-
uisite "real and substantial interest." Thus, the particular legal
form of the taxpayer's interest in the depletable property was
held not to be the determinative factor in the allocation of the
depletion allowance.
age of gross income was in the interest of convenience and in no way altered the
fundamental theory of the allowance." Commissioner v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S.
362, 367 (1938).
14 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
15 Id. at 369.
I6 I.R.C. § 611(b)(1) provides that, in the case of a lease, the depletion deduc-
tion shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and the lessee. When read
in conjunction with I.R.C. § 631(c), which authorizes a capital gain on royalties
received by the owner of coal under any form of contract by virtue of which such
owner retains an economic interest but also prohibits such owner from taking any
allowance for percentage depletion, § 611(b)(1) results in the apportionment be-
tween the lessor and lessee of the depletion allowance until the lessor achieves the
§ 631(c) one year holding period, after which the lessor is required to report the
royalties under the capital gains rules as authorized by that section. This then
leaves the lessee with the entire depletion allowance. Deduction of the royalty
paid to a lessor by a lessee (as authorized by Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co. for
the purposes of depletion) is now authorized for royalties paid pursuant to I.R.C.
§ 631(c). Treas. Reg. § 1.631-3(b)(3)(i), T.D. 6841, 1965-2 C.B. 200.
1980] 1119
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The trend away from the traditional common law real prop-
erty analysis continued in Palmer v. Bender,17 in which the Su-
preme Court established the judicial concept of an "economic in-
terest" in a mineral deposit. The Court held that the right to the
depletion allowance was not dependent on "retention of owner-
ship or any other particular form of legal interest in the mineral
content of the land."1 8 Instead, the Court ruled that an "economic
interest in the minerals in place"' 9 was required, stating that an
economic interest exists when "the taxpayer has acquired, by in-
vestment, any interest in the [mineral] in place and secures, by
any form of legal relationship, income derived from the extraction
of the [mineral], to which he must look for a return of capital. ' 20
The Court in propounding these guidelines acknowledged the
preservation of capital philosophy basic to the statute but drew
what have been called gossamer lines21 between the taxpayer per-
mitted the allowance for depletion and the taxpayer denied it by
replacing the criterion of real property estates with "any form of
legal relationship."
In Commissioner v. Bankline Oil Co. 22 the Court denied a
taxpayer a deduction for the depletion allowance, stating that
"the phrase 'economic interest' is not to be taken as embracing a
mere economic advantage derived from production, through a
contractual relation to the owner, by one who has no capital in-
vestment in the mineral deposit."23 The Bankline Oil Co. judicial
guideline of "economic advantage," together with the guidelines
established in Palmer v. Bender, constitutes what is now the cur-
rent Treasury regulation defining an "economic interest" in a
mineral.'
A second tier of judicial guidelines has developed in the area
of contract mining. In the cases of Parsons v. Smith25 and Para-
127 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
Is Id. at 557.
19 Id.
20 Id.
2' Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 38 (1946).
22 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
23 Id. at 367.
24 Trees. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309.
359 U.S. 215 (1959).
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gon Jewel Coal Co. v. Commissioner,2 the Supreme Court estab-
lished, by application of factual background, guidelines relating to
the existence or nonexistence of an economic interest in the con-
text of depletion deductions for contract miners. In Parsons v.
Smith the petitioners were partnerships engaged in the surface
mining of coal in Pennsylvania. The Court found the following
facts applicable: 27
(1) that petitioners' investments were in their equipment, all
of which was movable - not in the coal in place;
(2) that their investments in equipment were recoverable
through depreciation - not depletion;
(3) that the contracts were completely terminable without
cause on short notice;
(4) that the landowners did not agree to surrender and did
not actually surrender to petitioners any captial interest in the
coal in place;
(5) that the coal at all times, even after it was mined, be-
longed entirely to the landowners, and that petitioners could
not sell or keep any of it but were required to deliver all that
they mined to the landowners;
(6) that petitioners were not to have any part of the proceeds
of the sale of the coal, but, on the contrary, they were to be
paid a fixed sum for each ton mined and delivered, to be in
'full compensation for full performance of all work and for the
furnishing of all [labor] and equipment required for the work;'
and
(7) that petitioners, thus, agreed to look only to the landown-
ers for all sums to be due them under their contracts.28
The Court further found that the agreements between the
petitioners and the owners of the coal were "personal covenant[s],
and did not purport to grant [petitioners] an interest in the [coal
in place].""9 The taxpayers were deemed to have received a mere
economic advantage from their production of the coal, as con-
:$ 380 U.S. 624 (1965).
7 Indeed, the seven elements, determined by the Supreme Court to indicate
no economic interest in the coal in place in Parsons v. Smith have been inter-
preted by subsequent decisions of lower courts to be carved in stone. However,
they were simply a recitation of the facts in that case which seemed controlling for
application of the law previously discussed in this article. It is questionable
whether the Court intended such a precedential effect.
359 U.S. at 225.
29 Id.
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trasted to an economic interest in the coal in place.30 This was
based on the finding that the petitioners had no "capital invest-
ment in the mineral deposit which suffered depletion,"31 and they
were thus precluded from the depletion allowance.
These factors were cited with approval in Paragon Jewel
Coal Co. v. Commissioner.82 In Paragon Jewel the mining con-
tractors contended that they had made a capital investment in
the coal in place because of the nature and extent of their ex-
penditures in preparation for and in the performance of oral
agreements which they claimed granted them the right to mine
certain designated areas to exhaustion. They maintained that
they could look only to the extraction and sale of the coal for a
return on their investment and that the test of Parsons v. Smith
was thus satisfied.s It is interesting to note that the petitioners
were asserting the economic realities of the independent contrac-
tor situation indicated previously, which require intensive capital
investment throughout the period of mining, particularly in the
start-up (or development) stage.
The Tax Court had found, based on the guidelines of Par-
sons v. Smith, that the contract miners were not entitled to the
depletion allowance.3' However, the Fourth Circuit, agreeing with
the taxpayers, held that the contracts under which they mined
were not terminable at the will of Paragon but instead gave the
contractors "a continuing right to produce the coal and to be paid
therefor at a price which was closely related to the market
price.' "3 5 It based its decision on the fact that the operators made
"large expenditures of time and money in preparation for their
respective sites for mining" and observed that "it would be ineq-
uitable indeed to hold that Paragon might.., then take benefit
of the operators' efforts at will and without cause."38
The Supreme Court, siding with the Tax Court, reversed.
Significantly, Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissenting opinion, in which
30 Id. at 226.
31 Id.
n 380 U.S. 624, 627 (1965), rev'g 330 F.2d 161 (1964), rev'g sub nom. Merritt
v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 257 (1962).
33 380 U.S. at 627.
- 39 T.C. 257 (1962).
- 330 F.2d 161, 163 (1964).
" Id.
[Vol. 821122
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Mr. Justice Black joined, suggested that "[a] look through the
formal legal arrangements to the underlying economic realities
makes clear that the position of the miners is far closer to that of
the entrepreneur participating in a joint venture than to the seller
of services. '87 Using this reasoning, the minority argued that the
depletion allowance should be apportioned between the lessee
and the contract miners.-
Finally, in Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co.3 an
oil company engaged in drilling for state-owned offshore oil from
a private surface owner's adjacent lands paid to the owner a per-
centage of the net profits from the extraction and sale of the oil in
return for the right to maintain a well on the site. The Court
there held that, while the taxpayer-adjacent property owner pos-
sessed neither a fee nor leasehold interest in the oil in place, he
was entitled to the depletion allowance.40 However, the Court was
careful to limit the extension of the Palmer concept to the spe-
cific facts of the case. The Court stated "we decide only that
where, in the circumstances of this case, a party essential to the
drilling for and extraction of oil has made an indispensable con-
tribution to the use of the real property adjacent to the oil depos-
its in return for a share of the net profits from the production of
the oil, that party has an economic interest which entitled him to
depletion on the income thus received. 4 1
The Supreme Court thus allowed, in a case limited to its
facts, a taxpayer to take the deduction for depletion in a situation
which would appear to be analogous to that of the payment of a
wheelage fee in the coal mining industry.
I. PREsENT STATUS OF THE DEPLETION ALLOWANCE
Section 611 authorizes, in the case of mines, a deduction for
depletion of the mineral and a deduction for depreciation of im-
provements.42 The Treasury regulations limit annual depletion
37 380 U.S. at 639.
U Id. at 648.
:9 350 U.S. 308 (1956).
0 Id. at 316-17.
41 Id. at 317.
4 I.R.C. § 611 provides in pertinent part-
[a] general rule.-In the case of mines, oil and gas wells, other natu-
ral deposits, and timber, there shall be allowed as a deduction in corn-
1980] 1123
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deductions to the owner of an economic interest in coal and de-
fine economic interest under the guidelines set forth in Palmer v.
Bender..4  Thus, when the taxpayer has acquired by investment
an interest in the coal in place by any form of legal relationship in
which income is derived from the extraction of the coal, and to
which the taxpayer must look for a return of his capital invest-
ment, the taxpayer has such an economic interest.4" The present
regulations further adopt the test of Commissioner v. Bankline
Oil Co.,"5 which provides that the taxpayer with no capital invest-
ment in the coal deposit does not acquire an economic interest
through a contractual relation which yields a mere economic or
pecuniary advantage derived from the mining of the coal.40
The statutory structure further provides for the apportion-
ment of the depletion allowance between the lessor and the
lessee.47 However, this apportionment will end when the lessor or
sublessor attains a requisite holding period, after which he must
forego the depletion allowance under a provision that, in turn,
puting taxable income a reasonable allowance for depletion and for de-
preciation of improvements, according to the peculiar conditions in each
case; such reasonable allowance in all cases to be made under regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary.
43 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309 provides in part:
Annual depletion deductions are allowed only to the owner of an eco-
nomic interest in mineral deposits or standing timber. An economic in-
terest is possessed in every case in which the taxpayer has acquired by
investment any interest in mineral in place or standing timber and
secures, by any form of legal relationship, income derived from the ex-
traction of the mineral or severance of the timber, to which he must look
for a return of his capital.
45 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b)(1), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309 provides in perti-
nent part-
A person who has no capital investment in the mineral deposit... does
not possess an economic interest merely because through a contractual
relation he possesses a mere economic or pecuniary advantage derived
from production. For example, an agreement between the owner of an
economic interest and another entitling the latter to purchase or possess
the product upon production or entitling the latter to compensation for
extraction ... does not convey a depletable economic interest.
IR.C. § 611(b)(1) provides that "[i]n the case of a lease, the deduction
under this section shall be equitably apportioned between the lessor and the
lessee."
10
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treats the income from coal royalties as capital gains.48
Revenue Rulings, which reflect the position of the Service
but do not carry the weight of the law, have in the past empha-
sized the third test as stated in Parsons v. Smith9 (i.e., whether
the contracts are completely terminable without cause on short
notice). In these rulings, the Service has looked primarily to the
term of the contractual relationship between the owner and the
miner to determine whether the miner has a sufficient economic
interest in the coal in place to justify a deduction for depletion.50
In a relatively recent ruling, however, the Service has broken this
pattern and adopted the common law real property test. There
the Service denied to a contract miner a deduction for depletion
because the contract with the owner of the land was an oral con-
tract, invalid under the Kentucky Statute of Frauds.5 1 This deci-
sion was rendered despite the fact that the miner was paying the
owner a specified royalty per ton of coal mined and sold.
A survey of federal tax cases demonstrates that the courts
have had difficulty 52 in applying the Palmer v. Bender5 s require-
ments of investment in the coal in place and income derived from
its extraction and in applying the economic interest versus eco-
nomic advantage tests of Commissioner v. Bankline Oil Co.' To
resolve this dilemma the courts have turned to the more specific
guidelines of Parsons v. Smith5 and have applied the seven fac-
tors enumerated therein according to the facts of each case. How-
ever, the factors most emphasized are the duration of the con-
tract, factually addressed by clauses indicating an exclusive right
to mine or short-notice, no-cause termination clauses, and the
method by which the miner's compensation is based (i.e., whether
48 See I.R.C. § 631(c). For a thorough examination of this provision, see Cog-
gin, Federal Income Tax Treatment of the Acquisition and Disposition of Coal
Interests: An Examination of I.R.C. § 631(c), in this issue, infra.
" 359 U.S. 215 (1959). See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
50 See Rev. Rul. 73-33, 1973-1 C.B. 307; Rev. Rul. 73-32, 1973-1 C.B. 301;
Rev. Rul. 74-507, 1974-2 C.B. 179.
8 Rev. Rul. 77-341, 1977-2 C.B. 204.
52 See Commissioner v. Gregory Run Coal Co., 212 F.2d 52 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 828 (1954); Weirton Ice & Coal Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 231
F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1956).
53 287 U.S. 551 (1933). See note 20 supra.
54 303 U.S. 362 (1938).
55 359 U.S. 215 (1959).
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it is based upon a fixed rate per ton or is geared to the selling or
market price of coal)."
Although the case law exhibits some trends, with an empha-
sis on the guideline of terminability or capacity to mine to ex-
haustion, there exists even within these trends a diversity of ap-
proach and emphasis. This not only causes drafting problems for
the tax planner but, more significantly, it retards development of
domestic energy resources by forcing taxpayers into the Hobson's
choice of selecting between economic considerations and tax con-
siderations in designing their contractual and business
relationships.
For example, in Boiling v. Commissioner7 the Tax Court
found that a taxpayer mining under a valid lease agreement con-
taining a thirty day written notice cancellation clause had merely
an economic advantage and thus was denied the deduction for
depletion. Aside from the fact that the lease was subject to can-
cellation on thirty days' written notice, and the fact that the con-
tractor agreed to sell coal to the lessor, the lease appeared to con-
vey an interest in realty. It contained the typical provisions of
minimum land rent, payment of all taxes assessed on the prop-
erty, the conveyance clause "lessor does hereby let, lease and de-
mise unto lessee for strip mining purposes," and a recitation of
the source of title."1
This case, and the document which is partially reprinted in
the opinion, demonstrates the risks and difficulty encountered by
drafters and developers of mineral properties in their attempt to
design a contract that is consistent with the economic realities of
the situation but, at the same time, retains or conveys an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral in place for tax purposes. Whether
the document will be construed as conveying or retaining an eco-
nomic interest in the coal in place indefinitely depends upon the
weight given the various guidelines in Parsons v. Smith."
See, e.g., Contantino v. Commissioner, 445 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1971); Whit-
mer v. Commissioner, 443 F.2d 170 (3d Cir. 1971); McCall v. Commissioner, 312
F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1963); Elm Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 488 (4th Cir.
1963); United States v. Stallard, 273 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1959); Boiling v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 754 (1962); Fink v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1119 (1958).
57 37 T.C. 754 (1962).
" Id. at 756-57.
1, See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 821126
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In Boiling the petitioners argued that their acquisition of
surface rights and construction of haul roads were essential to the
production of coal and created an economic interest in the coal in
place under the rationale of Commissioner v. Southwest Explora-
tion Co.60 Disagreeing, the Tax Court was of the opinion that the
acquisition of the surface rights, access rights, wheelage rights,
and the payments for surface damage were only expense items
necessary to a successful surface mining operation.6 1
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held in Winters Coal Co. v.
Commissioner 2 that, since strip mining contracts required the
contract miner to obtain the surface rights, the contractor
thereby acquired an economic interest in the coal in place which
would allow a deduction for depletion, notwithstanding the fact
that either party could terminate the lease with thirty days' no-
tice. The court followed the Southwest Exploration Co. case,
stating that:
The case at bar is factually close to Southwest Exploration.
Coal could only be extracted from ABC's deposits by strip
mining. The law of real property required the permission of
the surface owners before the overburden could be removed to
reach the coal. The lease according to its terms, did not be-
come effective until the taxpayer had obtained that permis-
sion. Like Southwest Exploration, the state law and the leas-
ing arrangement required that the producer cooperate with
certain property owners. Once the taxpayer had acquired the
interest it purchased from the surface owners it was in the
same position as the upland property owners in Southwest
Exploration.63
The court, in addressing the Parsons v. Smith guidelines,"
found four factors in favor of an economic interest: that the in-
vestment could not be recovered by depreciation; that after min-
ing the coal belonged to the contract miner; that the contract
miner was to have all the proceeds of the sale of the coal; and
that petitioner did not agree to look only to the lessor for all in-
come. The court found one Parsons v. Smith guideline indicating
- 350 U.S. 308 (1956). See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
61 37 T.C. 754, 764 (1962).
42 496 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1974).
63 Id. at 1001.
Id. at 996-1000.
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only an economic advantage: that the leases were terminable on
short notice. With regard to the first and the fourth guidelines of
Parsons v. Smith (that the contract miners' investments were in
their equipment, not in the coal in place, and that the landowners
did not agree to surrender and did not actually surrender to the
contract miners any capital investment in the coal in place), the
judges indicated that they were uncertain whether the lease, ter-
minable on short notice, constituted a capital investment in the
coal in place but declined to decide the case solely on that point.
This exemplifies the classic difficulty in applying the two-part
capital investment guidelines set out in Palmer v. Bender. It is
also of interest to note that the pre-Supreme Court guideline
structure test, relating to common law real property interest, was
given weight and applied here by the Fifth Circuit in 1974.
A further example of the difficulty in the judicial application
of the guidelines stated in Parsons v. Smith is Holbrook v. Com-
missioner,5 in which the taxpayer mining under a document
(termed a license) was granted permission to mine the owner's
coal and sell it in whatever market he could establish. The Tax
Court denied the miner-licensee a deduction for depletion be-
cause a termination clause in the license provided a ten day no-
tice cancellation option to the licensor.
However, a majority of the Parsons v. Smith guidelines fa-
vored a finding of an economic interest in the miner. Prior to
commencing mining operations it was necessary for the miner, at
the expense of five thousand dollars, to improve the roof support
in the mines and to erect several buildings on the area covered by
the license, some of which were salvageable and others not. The
miner used a newly-purchased coal loader along with other equip-
ment previously obtained. Thus, the contract miner's investments
were not all in depreciable equipment, and a substantial portion
of these investments were not movable from the mining site. The
contracts were terminable on short notice. It is not known
whether the landowners agreed to surrender to the contract min-
ers any capital interest in the coal in place. The contract miner
not only was allowed to keep the coalbut also to sell it in
whatever third-party markets he was able to establish. He looked
directly to the proceeds of the sale of the coal for reimbursement
65 65 T.C. 415 (1975).
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and was not paid a fixed sum by the owner for each ton mined.
The contract miner was not required to look to the landowners
for assignments in order to be due them under his contract. In
sum, an application of four of the Parsons v. Smith factors would
favor the finding of an economic interest in the contract miner,
one would disfavor it, and two cannot be resolved.
As indicated previously, the courts have looked primarily to
the guideline of contract terminability in finding the existence or
absence of a depletable interest.6 A significant exception to that
philosohpy is found in the Court of Claims decision of Bakertown
Coal Co. v. United States,67 in which the court found an eco-
nomic interest in a coal property lessee and discounted the fact
that the lease contained a clause allowing termination on thirty
days' notice. The Bakertown Coal Co. case, a significant example
of the diverse and inconsistent approaches used in determining
the presence of an economic interest, develops a persuasive argu-
ment that property rights are more significant than terminability.
The Court of Claims, citing the premise of Palmer v.
Bender8 that the acquisition of a lease constituted a capital in-
vestment by which the requisite economic interest in the mineral
could be obtained, went on to analyze the government's preoccu-
pation with terminability. The court stated:
Though predicating its denial of plaintiffs' depletion rights
solely on the presence of a short-term terminability provision
in the subject mining leases, the Government makes no claim
that this feature of the agreements either nullifies them (as,
for example, sham) or otherwise operates to impart to their
remaining terms a meaning or significance materially differing
from that conveyed by a natural reading of the language em-
ployed. Thus, defendant does not dispute either that these
agreements were bona fide mineral leases or that, while in
force, they gave plaintiffs essentially the same autonomous au-
thority over extraction and sale of the underlying mineral as
did the leases in Palmer and Alworth-Stephens, where such
authority was held to constitute an ample basis for a deplet-
able interest. The property interest represented by that au-
thority is not varied or diminished simply because the author-
"' See notes 50 and 56 supra and accompanying text.
67 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
287 U.S. 511 (1933). See notes 17-21 supra.
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ity is subject to the possibility of extinction in the future by a
termination of the leases on short notice. The legal effect of a
termination on these leases is no less prospective because the
advance-notice requirement is only 30 days, than it would be if
the specified period were one year. 9
With regard to the government's argument based on termina-
bility, the court stated, "[i]t seems to us that the Government is
here attempting to remove transactions from the traditional am-
bit of economic interest by resort to a principle that it sponsored
to liberalize and expand that established concept to encompass
transactions not theretofore within it."0
The Internal Revenue Service has indicated that it will not
follow the Bakertown Coal Co. case.71
Two conclusions may be drawn from this survey of the case
law. First, there is no single factor or concrete set of factors upon
which a-tax planner could rely to assure the allowance or disal-
lowance of a deduction for depletion; and second, there has been
a revival of the traditional approach for determining that issue
which examines common law property principles in addition to
the statutory constructions propounded by the courts and by the
Internal Revenue Service.72
IV. DRAFTING TECHNIQUES FOR THE CONTRACT
MINING AGREEMENT
In this atmosphere of conflicting interpretation of Treasury
regulations and Supreme Court guidelines, attention to drafting
detail is crucial. Although a desired allocation of the depletion
allowance should be obtainable by exercising the requisite care,
some of these contractual clauses will be difficult to negotiate.
There are ten elements, as developed by the regulations and
cases, which should be addressed in drafting mining contracts.
69 485 F.2d at 636. As authority for the last proposition, with regard to the
legal effect of the disparity between a thirty day and one year notice, the court
cited H. Tn'FAwY, REAL PRoPRTY § 159, 588 (3d ed. 1939).
70 485 F.2d at 636.
71 Rev. Rul. 77-481, 1977-2 CB. 205.
7, See Thornberry Constr. Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 346 (Ct. Cl. 1978),
and Chief Tax Court Judge Drennon's dissenting opinion in Mullins v. Commis-
sioner, 48 T.C. 571 (1967), the case upon which the rationale of Bakertown Coal
Co. is based.
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These elements consist, first, of the Palmer v. Bender guidelines,
which were adopted by Treasury regulation, second, the seven
guidelines set out in Parsons v. Smith, and finally, the real prop-
erty considerations, which have been revitalized by the Court of
Claims in Bakertown Coal Co. These elements may be restated in
the form of drafting considerations as follows:
(1) Will the contractual arrangement be a conveyance of a
real property interest under state law?
(2) Will the miner have a capital investment in the coal in
place?
(3) Will the miner depend solely upon the extraction of the
coal for a return on his investment?
(4) Will the miner's investment be primarily in movable
equipment?
(5) Will the miner's investment in equipment be recoverable
through depreciation?
(6) Will the contract be terminable without cause on short
notice?
(7) Will the owner agree to surrender any capital interest in
the coal in place?
(8) Will the miner have the right to sell or keep any of the
coal, or will he be required to deliver the coal to the owner?
(9) Will the miner participate directly in the proceeds of sale
of the coal, or will he be paid a fixed sum for each ton mined?
(10) Will the miner look only to the owner for payment
under the contract?
The primary consideration in drafting a contract designed to
retain or create a depletable interest is the form of the relation-
ship between the owner of coal and the miner. It is presumed that
the parties to the venture have negotiated the allotment of a de-
pletion allowance and have decided which party is to realize its
benefit. If the coal owner78 is to retain his economic interest in
the coal in place, the form of the contract should establish the
contract miner as a independent contractor. If an economic inter-
est is instead to be conveyed to the miner,7 4 the contract should
73 In this context the term "owner" is defined as an entity having title to the
mineral estate, including a fee simple owner, a lessee, sublessee, assignee, or other
entity which has acquired by investment an economic interest in coal.
74 In this context the term "miner" is defined as an entity which will do the
actual mining and which does not have an economic interest in the coal in place
prior to the drafting of the contract.
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take the form of a lease or sublease - an interest arising from the
law of real property. Drafting to establish the miner as an inde-
pendent contractor is governed by the common law of employer-
independent contractor and is achieved by providing contractu-
ally certain indicia which create a lack of control by the owner.
The relationship of the parties should be established in the intro-
ductory clauses75 and maintained in the body of the contract by
clauses providing that the independent contractor supply the
equipment, tools, materials, and labor to perform the mining.76 In
addition to the specific provision of indicia establishing the miner
as an independent coniractor, a general acknowledgement of the
relationship by the parties to the contract is appropriate. 7
In the event owner and miner agree that the miner should
have the benefit of the depletion allowance, an instrument con-
veying title to the minerals is appropriate. A lease or sublease
from the owner to the miner will create an economic interest in
the coal in place in the miner and preserve an economic interest
in the owner, resulting in an allocation of depletion to the miner
and capital gain royalties to the owner. The lease or sublease
should contain granting, habendum, and description clauses, pro-
vide a fixed and/or percentage tonnage royalty, have a term suffi-
cient to mine the coal to exhaustion, and convey exclusive mining
rights. The format of the lease should be consistent with local
filing requirements (i.e., it should contain addresses of the par-
ties, acknowledgements, prepared-by statements, etc).
Drafting to establish affirmatively the criteria of Palmer v.
Bender (i.e., to create a depletable interest in the miner) is ac-
complished by leasing the mineral estate to the miner. The lease
itself constitutes a capital investment in the coal in place,7 8 and if
the miner pays the owner a royalty based upon coal mined and
sold, he will be dependent upon extraction of the coal for a return
on his investment.
If the owner desires to retain the depletion allowance, the
Palmer v. Bender criteria are established in the negative by con-
71 See APPENDIX, cls. 1, 2.
76 See APPENDIX, clS. 3, 4.
7 See APPENDIX, cl. S.
78 Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 511 (1933); Bakertown Coal Co. v. United
States, 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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tract clauses requiring the miner to furnish equipment, tools,
etc.,79 and by acknowledgements that he has no investment in the
coal in place.8 0 The miner's dependence upon the extraction of
the coal for a return on his investment may be negated by a
clause providing for a fixed fee payment to the miner as the sole
consideration for services rendered under the contract."1
Under the guidelines developed in Parsons v. Smith, a de-
pletable interest may be conveyed to the miner by lease clauses
providing a term of duration sufficient to mine all of the coal in
place, or providing for mining to exhaustion of the mineral, and
by provision for a fixed or percentage tonnage royalty. The lease
should not call for delivery of the coal to the owner, sale of the
coal by the owner, nor payment for the coal by the owner.
Observing the guidelines of Parsons v. Smith, the retention
of the depletable interest in the owner is achieved through the
specific and general drafting approaches suggested previously.
Specifically, the contract should contain clauses reciting *the
miner's responsibility to furnish equipment, machinery, etc.,82 a
clause providing for short-term, no-cause cancellation of the con-
tract,83 a requirement that the mined coal be delivered to the
owner," and a payment term stated as a fixed sum per ton of coal
mined as exclusive compensation for services rendered.8 5 The con-
tract should also contain a general statement of the owner's in-
tention to retain the depletion allowance.8 '
While attention to drafting detail should result in the desired
allocation of the depletion allowance, the contract weighted to ef-
fectuate the tax deductions will be inconsistent with the economic
realities of a mining venture. This practical inconsistency between
tax and economic consideration arises in the situation, described
above, in which the owner intends to retain the depletion deduc-
tion and establish the miner as an independent contractor. As
discussed previously the Service and many of the courts stress the
7, See APPENDIX, c1. 3.
80 See APPENDIX, c. 6.
8, See APPENDIX, cl. 7.
82 See APPENDIX, cL 3.
8 See APPENDIX, c1. 8.
See APPENDIX, c. 9.
" See APPENDIX, c. 7.
86 See APPENDIX, cl. 6.
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no-cause, short-notice terminability test in the construction of
mining contracts. This type of clause places the miner in the pre-
carious position of making a considerable investment in equip-
ment, access and haul roads, silt dams and ponds, and such other
facilities as may be required by the mining activity in order to
perform a contract which may be terminated on short notice
without breach or lack of performance by the miner.87 In contract
negotiations between owner and miner it is not surprising that
the term clause is almost inevitably one of the most difficult mat-
ters to resolve.
In many instances the owner will desire to employ an inde-
pendent contract miner and retain the depletion allowance, but
will authorize the miner to sell the mined coal. This arrangement,
which may be the only manner in which the coal may practicably
be sold, achieves economic goals, but the owner's retention of the
deduction for depletion may be questioned by the Service since it
would conflict with the Parsons v. Smith guidelines.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATORY MODIFICATIONS
As explained above, the most skillful drafting, cannot maxi-
mize depletion tax benefits without creating an unfavorable pos-
ture for the contract miner. At this time, that result could only be
brought about by modification of the Treasury regulations.
Treasury Regulation section 1.611-1 may be modified or sup-
plemented to alleviate the problems by the addition of a real
property interest test to establish the existence of "an economic
interest in the coal in place." The real property test, established
in 1925" and revitalized by the Court of Claims in 1973,8s is the
most straightforward and justiciable indicator of a depletable in-
terest. In most of the coal producing states, the real property
mineral estate is defined by law, and the existence of a depletable
interest should be considered established if the taxpayer is deter-
8 If the owner elects to cancel the contract on short notice and without cause
after the miner has built haul roads, silt dams, etc., the miner may be able to
recoup his losses on the theory of quantum meruit. See Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co.,
135 W. Va. 594, 64 S.E.2d 606 (1951). However, the mere existence of a possible
remedy, which would require the institution of litigation, is certainly not an incen-
tive to the miner.
" Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925).
99 Bakertown Coal Co. v. United States, 485 F.2d 633 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
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mined to own a mineral estate under this criterion, where
applicable.
Definition of the term "mere economic or pecuniary advan-
tage" used in Treasury Regulation section 1.611-1(b)(1) 9 ° would
also assist in the administrative and judicial allocation of the de-
pletion allowance. To that regulation should be added a definition
of the term "economic advantage" (currently distinguished from
an "economic interest," indicating a depletable interest) which
would apply to the holder of a mining permit, mining license, and
reclamation bond. This definition would broaden the scope of the
existing regulatory term, which is primarily directed to the con-
tractual relationship between the owner and miner, to include a
statement of position with regard to the significance of relation-
ships between the miner and third parties or regulatory agencies.
Although an economic interest in the mineral based upon these
factors would be somewhat artificial in a legal sense, they do re-
present a practical economic interest often maintained by con-
tract miners.
The third proposal is for the Service to modify its position by
emphasizing the affirmative investment in the mineral in place
and the return of capital concepts found in current Treasury Reg-
ulation section 1.611-1(b)(1)9 1 and Parsons v. Smith, and by no
longer considering as determinative the Parsons v. Smith tests of
no-cause, short-notice terminability, delivery of coal to the owner,
right to sell coal by the miner, payment for the coal by the owner,
and payment for the coal based upon a fixed sum per ton mined.
The final proposal is for the Service to define by discrete ex-
amples the legal relationships in which the depletion allowance
may be shared by the owner and miner. These examples should
include a vehicle by which the owner can contribute the mineral
(whether held in fee or by leasehold) to the capital of a partner-
ship, owned in some proportion by both owner and miner, in
which the deduction for depletion may be allocated between the
partners.
These proposals should facilitate the drafting of mining
agreements and, more significantly, equate the tax considerations
-o T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317.
91 Id.
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with the economic requirements of coal production.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the legislative history of the deduction for deple-
tion is devoid of any affirmative indication that its purpose is to
encourage the production of natural resources, such an incentive
is inherent in the statute itself, and that incentive could be real-
ized if the governmental bodies were to apply the deduction uni-
formly, with a logic consistent with the basic nature of the provi-
sion. The least that is required under the current state of the law
is a more definite guide for tax planners involved in contract min-
ing arrangements, and the creation of a clear-cut incentive in that
definitive process would seem to be particularly desirable in this
era of energy concern.
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APPENDIX
1. Whereas, owner has the right to mine certain
coal-bearing properties pursuant to certain deeds, leases,
subleases, or contractual arrangements; and
2. Whereas, owner desires to engage miner in the
capacity of an independent contract miner to mine cer-
tain coal from the property for a fixed sum cash pay-
ment per ton, and miner desires to accept such
engagement;
3. Miner agrees to furnish adequate and sufficient
equipment, machinery, tools, power, fuel, explosives,
water, materials and supplies to perform the mining op-
eration herein contemplated.
4. Owner agrees to furnish all personnel and labor
to perform the mining operations and shall be solely re-
sponsible in all respects for the employment and work-
ing conditions of all those persons so employed.
5. It is expressly agreed that miner will carry out
the services contemplated by this agreement as an inde-
pendent contractor. It is the intention of the parties that
owner has engaged miner to mine, load, and deliver cer-
tain coal pursuant to this agreement. It is understood by
the parties that the miner shall exercise complete and
exclusive control over the mining activity and over his
employees. Nothing herein shall be construed as creating
a single enterprise, joint venture, or employer-employee
relationship between miner and owner. Miner is not and
shall not represent itself to be a partner, agent, or repre-
sentative of owner.
6. It is expressly understood and agreed by and
between the parties that miner has no economic interest,
legal or beneficial, or any title to the coal in place as
mined hereunder; that the economic interest in said coal
is hereby reserved and retained by owner exclusively;
that the miner shall look to owner alone for any pay-
ment for all services rendered by miner hereunder, and
in no event to the proceeds received from the sale of
said coal; that miner undertakes the performance of the
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provisions of this agreement as independent contractor;
that the miner's investment is in his equipment and not
in the coal in place; and that miner agrees that for fed-
eral income tax purposes, he shall not claim a deduction
for mineral depletion.
7. Owner will pay to miner, as the sole and exclu-
sive consideration payable to miner for the services to be
performed by miner under this agreement, a payment of
- dollars per net ton of merchantable coal of two thou-
sand pounds (2,000 lbs.) delivered by miner to owner or
its assignee as compensation for extraction of coal mined
by the strip mining method.
8. Owner shall have the right to terminate this
agreement without cause, at any time, by giving thirty
(30) days' prior written notice of such termination to
miner. The termination of this agreement shall not,
however, invalidate or waive any of the indemnities,
warranties, or representations of the parties hereto, and
all of said indemnities, warranties, and representations
shall survive any termination of this agreement, but only
as to acts or events occurring prior .to the termination of
the agreement.
9. Coal mined hereunder shall be delivered by the
miner at its expense to owner by the miner loading same
on trucks designated by owner at the mine site, or deliv-
ered to owner's tipple or processing plant.
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